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In the opinion of the writer, a logical analysis of the action
for collation would result in the acceptance of the French view-
that the action for collation stands or falls with the right to par-
tition. The results of the Naudon case and the instant case would
be unchanged under this doctrine.18
W. M. S.
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-INFRINGEMENT BY MARK ON
HEAT-RESISTING GLASSWARE--GOODS OF SAME "CLASS"-Plaintiff,
a manufacturer of glass bottles, had applied the trade mark
"Rex" to prescription bottles sold to druggists since 1896. This
mark was registered in 1900 and re-registered in 1927. Since 1915
the defendant has used the mark "Pyrex" on many articles
of glassware made of heat-resisting glass, but has never manu-
factured prescription bottles. In 1922 defendant began to manufac-
ture nursing bottles which it sold under the mark "Pyrex," reg-
istered for nursing bottles in 1924. A few years thereafter, plain-
tiff applied its mark "Rex" to nursing bottles made from ordinary
glass. Plaintiff seeks an injunction based on his prior registration
and use of the term "Rex." The lower court found that there was
an infringement and enjoined defendant from using the trade
mark "Pyrex," not only upon nursing bottles, but upon all glass-
ware,1 and the defendant appeals. Held, the lower court erred in
its findings and plaintiff's bill should be dismissed. Corning Glass
Works v. Obear-Nester Glass Company, 113 F. (2d) 956 (C.C.A.
8th, 1940).
Under Section 16 of the Trade Mark Act of 1905,2 the ex-
13. In the Naudon case there had been a partition more than five years
preceeding the action for collation. Thus, under the French view, the action
would have been barred because the action for partition had prescribed.
But the court was emphatic that this was not the basis of its decision, for
it said, "A claim for collation, or reduction of an excessive donation inter
vivos, is prescribed by Article 3542 of the Revised Civil Code by the lapse
of five years from the death of the donor .. " Naudon v. Mauvezin, 194 La.
739, 742, 194 So. 766, 767 (1940). The court went on to say that the "right
of action lapsed in January," which was five years from the death of the
donor, but less than five years from the partition.
There had been no partition in the instant case.
1. Plaintiff based its claim for injunction solely upon the alleged infringe-
ment of the statutory trade mark. There was no claim of unfair competition,
unfair practices, nor fraud.
2. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724 (1905), 15 U.S.C.A. § 96 (1934). Section
16 provides: "Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner there-
of, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such trade mark and
affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same description proper-
ties as those set forth in the registration, . . shall be liable to an action
for damages. .. "
clusive right to use a trade mark is limited to use on the "class"
of goods for which it was registered, and to merchandise of sub-
stantially the same descriptive properties.' Hence plaintiff would
be entitled to enjoin use by another of the trade mark "Rex," or
a mark confusingly similar, on the class of goods covered by
plaintiff's registered mark. This would likewise be true at com-
mon law even in the absence of registration.4 The court held,
however, that for trade mark purposes heat-resisting nursing
bottles do not fall within the classification that embraces pre-
scription bottles. The court cited with approval the rule that the
fact that one person has adopted and used a trade mark on his
goods does not prevent the adoption of the same mark or a simi-
lar one by another on articles of a different description or class. 5
To constitute an infringement of another's trade mark, there
must be a use of the same or a confusingly similar mark on the
same "class" of goods.6 There must be found to exist a confusion
with respect both to marks and to class. The situation must be
such that the unwary purchaser is likely to believe he is buying
goods manufactured by the plaintiff when he purchases defend-
ant's goods. Even if the goods are of the same class, no infringe-
ment exists unless the marks used are confusingly similar. In
this case the court interjected the statement that there was no
confusion of marks, that "Pyrex" was not a colorable imitation
of "Rex." It is difficult to reconcile this holding with other de-
cisions in which confusion of marks was passed upon. For ex-
ample, it has been held that "Cupola" is infringed by "Com-
posite,"7 "Coca-Cola" by "Taka-Cola,"8 "Wearever" by "Everlast-
ing,"9 and "Star" by "Lone Star."'10 It appears that the court itself
3. The court pointed out that the goods of plaintiff and defendant did
not have the same descriptive properties. The defendant's goods constituted
a distinct class because of their heat-resisting qualities which plaintiff's
goods confessedly did not have.
For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase "of the same descriptive
properties," see Pearne and Crotty, Trade Mark Registration and the Lan-
ham Bill (1941) 9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 319-327.
4. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Kenilworth Mfg. Co., 40 F. (2d) 121 (C.C.P.A.
1930); In re General Petroleum Corporation of California, 49 F. (2d) 966
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
5. American Steel Founderies v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 46 S. Ct. 160,
70 L. Ed. 317 (1926).
6. See F. W. Fitch Co. v. Camille, Inc., 106 F. (2d) 635 (C.C.A. 8th, 1939).
7. Keuffel & Esser Co. v. H. S. Crocker Co., 118 Fed. 187 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1902).
8. Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 Fed. 600 (C.C.A.
4th, 1921).
9. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. National Aluminum Works, 226 Fed.
815 (W.D.N.Y. 1915).
10. Hutchinson v. Covert, 51 Fed. 832 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1892).
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was not thoroughly convinced on this point, for had it been con-
fident of its ruling, it could have rested its judgment on that
basis alone, and it would not have been necessary to find, as the
court did, that the goods were not confusingly similar in "class.""'
In discussing whether or not goods are of the same class, the
courts, as in the principal case, often purport to determine
whether or not the goods sold by plaintiff and defendant have
the same "descriptive properties." A more dependable test, how-
ever, is whether or not the goods marketed by the defendant are
of a type that the average unwary purchaser would normally
believe the plaintiff to manufacture. Do they belong in a field
which the plaintiff would likely occupy in the course of a normal
expansion?" In the last analysis, the question of identity of class
is a problem of the likelihood of confusion in the public mind.18
In making this determination, the fact that the goods of the
plaintiff and those of the defendant have the same descriptive
properties is a matter of considerable importance. For example,
if the plaintiff markets "Star" hams and the defendant places
upon the market "Star" lard, the public will more likely believe
that the defendant's product originated with the plaintiff than
if the defendant had marketed a "Star" automobile. Identity of
descriptive properties, however, is by no means the final criterion.
In the instant case the court stated that the defendant's
products constituted a distinct class because of their heat-resist-
ing qualities, which the plaintiff's goods confessedly did not have,
adding that it would be difficult to believe that any confusion
could possibly result from the use of the mark "Pyrex" on the
defendant's distinctive wares. There was little likelihood that
any person might be led to purchase the defendant's goods be-
lieving that he was purchasing those of the plaintiff.
Apart from identity of descriptive properties, there are sev-
eral other factors of importance in determining the likelihood of
confusion of goods. The extent to which the goods of the plain-
11. The court set forth a lengthy argument to the effect that the Rex
nursing bottles were not confusingly similar to the Pyrex bottles; then it
added that in any event plaintiff entered the field after defendant had
already occupied it, thereby acquiring a prior right to the use of the trade
mark on nursing bottles.
12. Wilcox & White Co. v. Leiser, 276 Fed. 445 (S.D. N.Y. 1918); William
Waltke & Co. v. Geo. H. Schafer & Co., 49 App. D.C. 254, 263 Fed. 650 (1920).
13. See Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35 (C.C.A.
8th, 1910); British-American Tobacco Co. v. British-American Cigar Stores
Co., 211 Fed. 933 (C.C.A. 2d, 1914); Vick Medicine Co. v. Vick Chemical Co.,
11 F. (2d) 33 (C.C.A. 5th, 1926). Pearne and Crotty, supra note 3.
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tiff and defendant have common purchasers and a common mar-
ket is a persuasive factor.14 In the present case the plaintiff's
prescription bottles are sold wholesale to the druggist trade and
reach the consumer only as an anonymous container of the drug
he has asked for, whereas the defendant's nursing bottles are
retailed directly to parents. Likewise, if the two kinds of goods
are used for wholly different purposes, there is a lesser degree
of likelihood that they will be associated with a single source. 5
In the present case the court emphasized the heat-resisting quali-
ties of the defendant's products, a feature which adapted them
to special uses for which ordinary glass, such as that manufac-
tured by the plaintiff, is unfit.
The court's conclusion appears to be sound, although the
language employed is not as clear and precise as might be de-
sired.
J.T.B.
TRUSTS-ACT 107 OF 1920-VALIDITY OF PREMATURE TERMI-
NATION-A testarix created a short term trust under the provi-
sions of Act 107 of 1920.1 Upon the insistence of the plaintiff, a
beneficiary who had attained the age of majority and was of
full legal capacity, the trustee and the other beneficiaries con-
sented to a termination of the trust several years prior to the
date provided in the will. The principal was distributed among
the beneficiaries. After squandering his portion, the plaintiff
brought this action to have the trust estate reconstituted and the
agreement declared void. Held, that the 1920 act did not pro-
hibit the termination of trusts by agreement between the bene-
ficiary and the trustee, and that the plaintiff was estopped from
annuling the settlement with his trustee, since he was unable
to return the trust property. Hagerty v. Clement, 195 La. 230,
196 So. 330 (1940).
14. See Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674
(C.C.A. 3rd, 1921); Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Hudson Tire Co., 21 F. (2d) 453
(D.C.N.J. 1927); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co.,
53 F. (2d) 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
15. Most of the cases illustrating this position deal with complimentary
articles. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C.C.A.
2d, 1917) ("Aunt Jemima" for pancake flour and syrup); Akron-Overland Tire
Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1921) ("Overland" for
automobiles and tires); American Tobacco Co. v. Gordon, 10 F. (2d) 646 (App.
D.C. 1925) ("Pall Mall" for cigarettes and cigarette holders).
1. La. Act. 107 of 1920, repealed by La. Act 7 of 1935 (3 E. S.) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § § 9815-9822].
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